Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
best of a bad bargain for their weak and vulnerable society, hoping thus to ride piggyback on Japanese "modernity." A few visionary ones, echoing the Pan-Asianist circles of Japan, thought that because of racial and cultural affinities with Japan they might assist Tokyo in developing a northeast Asian umbrella under which the Koreans and Japanese would coexist and flourish as equals. Conceivably, for some others the eventual emergence of a transcendent, "hybrid" identity on the British model appears to have been attractive, as the author suggests in the book's conclusion.
Of course, as Caprio amply documents, such visions foundered on the rocks of widespread Japanese notions of superiority leading to harshness, discrimination, and slights inflicted daily on all but the most privileged minority of Koreans. Patterns of education, employment, services, and residence for the most part continued to reflect serious disproportion and humiliating barriers between Japanese and Koreans, despite some marginal improvements over time. Even among those theoretically willing to extend their trust and goodwill to Koreans, there was often the condescending talk of "preparing" the Koreans for equality under decades of "advanced" Japanese tutelage. (This rhetoric reminds me of the stillborn trusteeship idea that the Allies in World War II cooked up for the restoration of Korean sovereignty "in due course.") Perhaps, given the inflated notions of Japanese "uniqueness" based on their throne's "divine" origins myth-ancient in provenance but more assiduously nurtured after the Meiji Restoration-it was impossible for most Japanese to entertain the idea of equality between the two nations. I suspect that at the psychological level, notwithstanding the racial and cultural affinities between Koreans and Japanese that some politicians and scholars stressed as a bond between them, and despite the fact that Shinto and emperor-centered rituals were relentlessly pushed by the Japanese rulers of Korea, this would have remained an insurmountable task; the project obviously militated against Japanese "uniqueness."
Caprio has fleshed out the theme of assimilation with rich detail and nuance and thrown a fresh light on the complex nature of Japanese rule in Korea and its limitations-a rule that was riddled with logical holes all over its fabric and, among other things, proved quite naïve as well. Ken C. Kawashima has crafted a robust book examining the daily lives of Korean day laborers as a means of revitalizing discussion of the processes of class-formation in interwar Japan. Perceptively, and sometimes quite humorously, Kawashima offers a unique view on the ways in which the commodification of labor power is "interrupted, disrupted, suspended, deferred, delayed, and prolonged" (p. 10). He argues that Korean day laborers, although "chronically unemployed, immigrant day workers in the public works industry," were among the first members of Japan's prewar industrial proletariat precisely because they were "expropriated from their land in Korea, and compelled to find work in Japan-but with no guarantees of finding it" (p. 10).
In doing so, Kawashima has relocated the axis of working-class formation from the contingency of employment within the factory to the continuously contingent experience of finding and re-finding work itself. At times burdened by an overly elaborate theoretical position, Kawashima has nevertheless presented a unique and powerful social history that will reshape our understanding of the codeterminant processes of colonization and industrialization. He observes that Korean in-migrants to Japan after 1920 were "caught between agricultural immiseration in Korea . . . and an industrial recession in Japan." Market forces combined with ethnic discriminatory practices to create conditions in which Korean men coming to Japan to find factory work "increasingly faced closed factory doors, and even when they were open, Koreans were soon cast out as disposable and temporary workers" (p. 65).
Kawashima argues that this "virtual pauperization" channeled Korean men into the day labor market "through the mediation of various state apparatuses and their disavowed and supplementary forms, such as Korean welfare organizations" (p. 67). Even mutual aid societies, ostensibly formed to lend a helping hand to the struggling day laborer, further facilitated the process of pauperization by ameliorating a few minor conditions without significantly changing the struggle to find and re-find work at the core of the day laborer's existence. "It is here," asserts Kawashima, "that Korean workers felt the double shackles of low wages and ethnic discrimination in a 'particular and highly specific' way" (p. 93).
In chapter four ("Urban Expropriation and the Threat of the Outside"), Kawashima examines the extent to which blatant patterns of discriminatory renting practices on the part of urban landlords over-determined the tenancy opportunities of Korean workers in Japan. He argues that inflated rent prices relative to falling wages, which characterized employment patterns for Korean day laborers from the late 1920s to the late 1930s, resulted in the expropriation of lease-holding property from ethnic Koreans in a fashion "uncannily similar" to the conditions that had originally precipitated the process of in-migration from rural Korea to urban Japan (p. 128). Even in an economy characterized by rapidly declining wages, landlords charged ethnic Koreans higher rents while simultaneously being more likely to evict Korean tenants. Importantly, Kawashima identifies key forms of resistance in the way that Korean day laborers rented under Japanese names and counter-extorted "eviction fees" from landlords who sought to displace them. When push came to shove, however, landlords called on police and the courts to enforce their property rights, and state involvement favored them in all but a few cases.
Ultimately a form of what he astutely identifies as state regulated employment insecurity, the Unemployment Relief Programs (UERP), institutionalized the "basic conditions for the exploitation of Korean labor power as cheap, colonial labor." Created in 1925, the UERP created an elaborate registration system ostensibly designed to minimize intermediary exploitation and regularize the incomes of urban day laborers by fixing minimum wages. Kawashima argues, however, that wage differentials between Korean day laborers and their Japanese counterparts remained unchanged even after the inception of the UERP. He argues that the UERP instead operated as a means of registering Koreans "with state apparatuses in order to promote, regulate, and enforce a life indebted to wage labor and the state" (p. 203).
Kawashima's argument is situated within a compelling narrative of the struggle to find work during an era when being Korean also meant being a subaltern subject of an expanding Japanese empire. While Kawashima's theoretical agenda clearly lies elsewhere, a great deal of recent scholarship has demonstrated the importance of gender when seeking to unpack the history of the working class. Many of the source materials examined seem laden with gendered notions of class and ethnicity, as well as classed and ethnicized notions of gender, that warrant further examination. This book would have particularly benefited from an examination of the extent to which notions of gender also influenced the experiences of the male day laborers at the center of Kawashima's study. Despite these few drawbacks, Kawashima has delivered a well-researched social history that should be added to the reading list of all serious students of modern Korea and Japan.
CHRISTOPHER Waziristan is a remote mountainous region of Pakistan situated on the border with Afghanistan. Inhabited by well-armed and independent-minded Pashtun tribes, the mountains of Waziristan form a natural fortress. The Pashtun tribes have been described as "the largest known potential reservoir of guerrilla fighters in the world" (p. 59). In recent years, Waziristan has become a sanctuary for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, and a possible refuge for Osama bin Laden. On the western side of the international border, in southern Afghanistan, troops of NATO armies and their Afghan allies face similar challenges of tribal insurgency. Andrew M. Roe has produced a timely study of Waziristan. Roe claims that "practical measures and valuable insights into the British experience in Waziristan remain relevant and worthy of consideration by today's policy makers" (p. 13). In 1893, the Durand Line established a formal international frontier between northwestern India and Afghanistan. The tribes of Waziristan thus acquired a legal status as British subjects. Centuries of seclusion, however, had created an anarchic society in the mountains. The Muslim tribes lived by a code of honor known as Pashtunwali that emphasized the need for vengeance, hospitality, skill at arms, and individual autonomy. Tribal headmen-maliks-exercised only loose control over their clans. When the tribe faced a threat from outsiders, religious leaders proclaimed jihad to unite the clans under the banner of Islam.
British colonial policy prior to World War I generally was to leave the tribes in isolation. Roe compares them to tigers in a national park: "They could kill what deer they liked in the park; they risked a bullet if they came outside and took the village cattle" (p. 195) . After a fierce revolt in Waziristan in 1919-1920 a policy of "control from within" was adopted by the government (p. 95). Roads were built and tribal police were employed to guard government property. Large regular army garrisons were based deep in Waziristan, a practice not generally pursued in other tribal areas apart from the vital Khyber Pass. Political agents and paramilitary scouts were the eyes and ears of the regime. A system of tribal allowances already in existence was refined and paid to clan leaders to build leverage in tribal society.
Renewed warfare erupted in Waziristan in November 1936. Mirza Ali Khan, the Fakir of Ipi, led opposition to the government's presence in Waziristan at a time of heightened religious tension. The permanent basing of regular troops deep in tribal territory played a major role in sparking the revolt. In 1937, 40,000 troops and paramilitary forces failed to capture the Fakir of Ipi, "something from which Osama bin Laden can draw some comfort" (p. vii). The biplanes of the Royal Air Force did not make a decisive impact. Aerial bombing was merely a new way to antagonize tribal society. The insurgency continued into the 1940s. After the creation of Pakistan, the new authorities continued the old colonial methods, but without the stationing of army garrisons in tribal territory.
Roe's book does not set out to provide an overall narrative account of the British period in Waziristan. The fighting of 1919-1920 is only referred to briefly. Rather, he focuses primarily on the last major revolt to take place, which is the Fakir of Ipi's insurgency from 1936 onward. Roe views this period as the most relevant part of the colonial period as it is the most recent. The work concludes with three chapters of analysis of the connections between the past and present. Roe stresses the need for careful study of Waziristan if state authorities
